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INSTITUTIONALIZING INNOVATION: THE
NEW YORK DRUG COURT STORY
John Feinblatt, Greg Berman, and Aubrey Fox*
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to overstate the impact that drugs have had on the
American criminal justice system-and courts in particular-in re-
cent years. The drug epidemic that began in the 1980s (and the war
against drugs that continues to this day) has placed tremendous
burdens on almost every part of the system.1 The strain can be
seen in the widespread overcrowding in correctional facilities.2 It
can be seen in the resources that police and prosecutors have had
to dedicate to new enforcement programs.3 And it can be seen in
the courts which have struggled to keep pace with the resulting
explosion in caseload volume.4
No state is exempt from these forces, of course, but New York
offers a particularly vivid example of a court system grappling with
the consequences of drugs and crime. According to New York
State Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye:
[W]hile major crimes rates are heading toward record lows, fil-
ings in our criminal courts are soaring to all-time highs. And the
substance of this caseload reflects some of the most daunting
* John Feinblatt is the director of the Center for Court Innovation, the New
York State Court system's independent research and development arm, and a mem-
ber of the New York State Commission on Drugs and the Courts. Greg Berman and
Aubrey Fox are, respectively, deputy director and senior consultant at the Center for
Court Innovation.
1. E.g., Gregory P. Falkin et al., Drug Treatment in the Criminal Justice System, 58
FED. PROBATION 31, 31 (1994) (describing the strains of the war on drugs on the
various components of the criminal justice system).
2. E.g., Ethan G. Kalett, Tvelve Steps, You're Out (of Prison): An Evaluation of
"Anonymous Programs" as Alternative Sentences, 48 HASTINas L.J. 129, 133-136
(1996) (discussing the overcrowding in jails and prisons caused by the war on drugs).
3. See W. Clinton Terry HI, Prosecutors and the Evaluation of Dedicated Drug
Treatment Courts, 31 PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 32 (referring to the impact on
courts and prosecutors of increased drug caseloads and suggesting the consideration
of drug courts to increase the speed of drug crime enforcement).
4. Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treat-
ment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to
Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 439, 459-62 (1999)
(describing how drug arrests have outpaced other criminal arrests since 1980). See
generally Colloquy, The Drugging of the Courts: How Sick is the Patient and What is
the Treatment? 73 JUDICATURE 314 passim (1990).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
problems facing our society today .... Last year, nearly half of
all felony filings in this State were drug-related . . . [D]rug
abuse was the fuel driving much of the criminal justice system's
revolving door.5
Statistics confirm this bleak assessment: in 1980, there were
27,000 drug arrests in New York. By 1999, that number had
skyrocketed to more than 145,000-a 430% increase.6 Even when
a defendant is arrested for a crime that is not explicitly drug-re-
lated, drug use often played a role. According to the National In-
stitute of Justice, eight out of every ten defendants arrested in New
York City in 1998 for all crimes tested positive for drugs at the time
of their arrest.7
While the numbers are staggering, they only hint at the true
scope of the problem. The challenge that this massive influx of
cases poses for courts in New York and other states is not simply
how to manage dockets more efficiently. It is how to do justice in
cases that almost always involve litigants with complicated
problems. As Chief Judge Kaye has written:
Not surprisingly, in many of today's cases, the traditional ap-
proach yields unsatisfying results. The addict arrested for drug
dealing is adjudicated, does time, then goes right back to dealing
on the street .... Every legal right of the litigants is protected,
all procedures followed, yet we aren't making a dent in the un-
derlying problem. Not good for the parties involved. Not good
for the community. Not good for the courts.8
Recognizing this reality, judges across New York have begun to
rethink how courts respond to drug-related cases, testing new ways
to halt the "revolving door" of drugs, crime, and jail. The most
obvious sign of this experimentation has been the creation of
twenty "drug treatment courts" across the state. These are special-
ized courtrooms that take a problem-solving approach to addiction,
linking nonviolent defendants to long-term, judicially-supervised
drug treatment instead of incarceration. Defendants are required
to return to court frequently to report on their progress before the
judge, who uses a variety of "carrots and sticks" to encourage par-
5. Chief Judge Judith Kaye, Second Annual State of the Judiciary Address (Feb-
ruary 8, 1999).
6. N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON DRUGS & THE COURTS, CoNForNTING THE CYCLE
oF ADDICTION & RECIDIVISM: A REPORT TO CHIEF JUDGE JUDITH S. KAYE 10 (June
2000) [hereinafter FisKE COMM'N REP.].
7. Id. at 15.
8. Judith S. Kaye, Making the Case for Hands-On Courts, NEWS\VEEK, Oct. 11,
1999, at 13.
278
NEW YORK DRUG COURT STORY
ticipation in treatment. If defendants fail, they are subject to a
range of graduated sanctions, including letters of apology, more in-
tense treatment regimes, and, if necessary, jail. Meanwhile, success
in treatment often results in the original charges against defendants
being dismissed.
Though a relatively recent phenomenon, drug courts in New
York and other states have demonstrated that they are capable of
achieving significant results. National research suggests that drug
courts have succeeded in reducing drug use and recidivism among
offenders. 9 Further, the research indicates that the retention rates
for defendants in mandated treatment are about double the rates
for those who pursue treatment voluntarily. 10
These two realities-the crushing increase in drug-related cases
in New York courts over the past generation and the demonstrated
effectiveness of drug courts in promoting sobriety among offend-
ers-underlie Chief Judge Kaye and Chief Administrative Judge
Jonathan Lippman's recent announcement that they plan to
restructure the New York State court system's response to drug-
fueled crime. Among other things, their plan-the product of a
six-month study by a blue ribbon panel headed by Robert Fiske,
Jr.-calls for adopting drug court principles in every jurisdiction in
New York, offering judicially-monitored drug treatment as an al-
ternative to incarceration to nearly 10,000 addicted offenders
annually.1'
What makes this plan unique is that it is the most ambitious at-
tempt to date to reassemble the DNA of a state court system with
respect to drug-addicted offenders and litigants. In effect, Chief
Judge Kaye has called for drug courts to move from their current
status as isolated, boutique experiments into the mainstream of ju-
dicial operations in New York. While many states have gone out of
their way to encourage the replication of drug courts, only New
York has begun to ask whether it is possible for this experiment in
judicial problem-solving to lead to a full-scale reform of a state
9. Steve Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1 NAT'L. DRUG
CT. IN ST. REv. 10, 43 (1998).
10. Id. at 66.
11. Robert Fske is the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York and a partner with the law firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell. The 10,000 estimate
is based on the number of offenders who would have been eligible for treatment
under the Fske plan in 1999. FisKE CoNM1'N RlP., supra note 6, at 4; see also Kathe-
rine E. Finkelstein, New York to Offer Most Addicts Treatment Instead of Jail Terms,
N.Y. Txrms, June 23, 2000 at Al (mentioning how New York will be the first state to
offer all nonviolent drug offenders the option of treatment instead of jail and discuss-
ing the program).
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court system. For New York, the potential benefits of pursuing this
course of action are enormous: safer communities, healthier fami-
lies, substantial prison cost savings, and improved public confi-
dence in justice. But any large-scale reform effort also comes with
challenges. Institutionalizing a small-scale innovation like drug
courts will require new thinking, new resources, and new ways of
doing business.
This essay looks at both the opportunities and the challenges of
New York State's new statewide drug treatment initiative. It out-
lines the possible results that this reform might achieve, including
both the obvious (e.g., reduced drug use and recidivism) and the
not-so-obvious (e.g., expedited permanency decisions in cases in-
volving substance-abusing parents and reductions in the length of
time that children spend in foster care). In addition, it poses some
of the tough questions that must be confronted as drug courts at-
tempt to "go to scale": To what extent do drug courts require sys-
tem players-judges, prosecutors, defenders-to alter their
traditional roles? How willing are they to become active problem-
solvers? Can any judge be a drug court judge? Are specialized
courtrooms necessary, or can the tools developed in drug courts-
judicial monitoring, early assessment of offenders, links to treat-
ment-become part of the standard judicial approach? Is it desira-
ble-and politically feasible-to extend the drug court approach to
some offenders who have committed violent offenses in the past?
How about property offenders? What about the up-front invest-
ment that any large reform effort requires? Do the resources exist
to assess thousands of additional defendants, place them in treat-
ment slots, and pay for their care? Finally, how important to the
success of drug courts has their small size been? Will going to scale
have the ironic result of undermining drug courts' effectiveness?
Will drug courts become a victim of their own success?
These are questions with profound implications not only for New
York but for court reform efforts across the country. As this essay
is written, New York State has embarked on the most ambitious
effort to date to institutionalize drug court innovation. Given the
kinds of results that drug courts have achieved, it surely will not be
the last. Any effort to follow New York's lead inevitably will have
to address both the possibilities and the challenges of institutional-
ization. But before taking a deeper look at these issues, a brief
overview of the problems posed by drugs in New York, and the
results that drug courts have achieved to date, is in order.
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Tim PROBLEM
The rising tide of drug arrests in the last twenty years in New
York has sent shock waves through the justice system. The costs of
this increase can be seen in the courts, probation departments,
prosecutors' offices, prisons, and jails. In 1999 alone, the court sys-
tem spent $115 million adjudicating drug cases.12 The cost for the
state's prison system is even steeper: close to $650 million annually
to imprison drug felons.13 In addition, local corrections depart-
ments, which house pretrial detainees and offenders serving
sentences of less than one year, received 21,000 drug sentences in
1999; the average cost of jail in New York City, where the majority
of detainees are held, is $68,000 per year.'4
Nor are the costs confined to the criminal justice system. Drug
addiction has taken a toll on the state's Family Courts as well. Of
the 465,000 children who are under the court-ordered supervision
of New York City's Administration for Children's Services, an esti-
mated 70% come from families with a substance abuse problem.'5
Lacking the capacity to assess and treat addiction and facing enor-
mous caseloads, most Family Court cases drag on indefinitely, leav-
ing parents in limbo and their children in foster care. Between
1985 and 1991, the number of children in foster care in New York
City nearly tripled from about 17,000 to 50,000, while the average
length of stay leapt from 1.81 years in 1985 to 4.5 years by 1997.16
Beyond the costs associated with incarcerating offenders or plac-
ing children in foster care, the impact of drugs can be felt in the
quality of justice delivered by New York's courts. While drug ar-
rests are up 430% over the last twenty years, there has been only a
15% increase in the number of state judgeships." One result of
this imbalance between supply and demand has been overwhelmed
courtrooms where harried judges, prosecutors, and defenders are
forced to process cases as quickly as possible.
Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the drug offenders who
pass through the court system without receiving meaningful treat-
ment are rearrested quickly. Thirty-four percent of drug offenders
12. FisKE CormI'N REP., supra note 6 at 11.
13. FisKaE Coni'N REP., supra note 6, at 1, 12. A "snapshot" of the state prison
system in February 2000 showed that 22,000 of the state's 71,000 inmates were impris-
oned for a drug crime. Fisicn CoNMI'N REP., supra note 6, at 12.
14. 1 THE N.Y. FINANCIAL PLAN, FISCAL YRS. 2000-2004 38 (2000) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL PLAN].
15. FISKE CONINI'N REP., supra note 6, at 58.
16. FINANCIAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 5.
17. FINANCIAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 10.
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released from state prison in 1998 were rearrested within a year; a
similar cohort of prisoners released in 1996 had a 56% recidivism
rate after three years. In New York City, the two-year recidivism
rate for drug felony arrestees is 50%. Finally, close to one-third of
parolees had their parole revoked for committing new felonies
within three years.18
DRUG COURTS
New York's surge in caseload volume has created a window of
opportunity for reformers throughout the court system. Many ju-
risdictions have taken advantage of this to create specialized drug
treatment courts.
Drug courts are just one example of a growing trend in the world
of court reform: the creation of "problem-solving courts" that seek
to forge new responses to difficult problems like domestic violence,
quality-of-life crime, child neglect, and mental illness. Although
they address very different problems, mental health, community,
domestic violence, and drug courts all share a common approach.
They use the coercive authority of the courts to achieve more
meaningful case outcomes. 19 They build new partnerships with
treatment providers, community groups, and others outside of the
traditional criminal justice system.20  Problem-solving courts
broaden the focus of legal proceedings from fact-finding and nar-
row legal issues to changing the future behavior of litigants (and
the future well-being of communities).21
Drug courts focus exclusively on drug cases, linking substance-
abusing offenders (who have voluntarily agreed to enter the pro-
gram) to treatment. While there are many different drug court
models (e.g., pre-plea, post-plea, and diversion), in general, if a
participant successfully completes treatment, the judge will reduce
the charges or dismiss the case. In drug courts, unlike most crimi-
nal courts, the judge plays an ongoing, post-plea role, requiring
participants to report back regularly to court for drug testing and
to appear before the bench. The judge reviews participant progress
18. FINANCIAL PLAN, supra note 14, at 14.
19. Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving Courts: A Brief Primer 1
(2000) (unpublished paper on file with authors) [hereinafter Berman & Feinblatt]; see
also David Rottman & Pamela Casey, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Emergence
of Problem-Solving Courts, NAT'L. INST. OF Jusr. J., July 1999 at 12 (arguing that
courts should be engaged in collaboration vith local and state agencies to find oppor-
tunities to promote therapeutic outcomes for individuals (therapeutic jurisprudence)).
20. See Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 19, at 9.
21. Berman & Feinblatt, supra note 19, at 1-2.
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through treatment programs, offering a set of graduated rewards
and sanctions where appropriate. Eligibility for drug court partici-
pation is typically restricted to non-violent offenders with sub-
stance abuse problems. Individuals with prior violent convictions,
or those believed to be involved in drug trafficking schemes, are
usually ineligible.
The first drug court opened in Dade County, Miami in 1989 dur-
ing the height of the crack cocaine epidemic. Since then, aided by
the U.S. Department of Justice's Drug Courts Program Office
(which distributed $50 million in grants in fiscal year 2000), drug
courts have grown at a phenomenal rate. Today there are more
than 500 courts nationwide, including one in operation or being
planned in every state.22 An additional 281 are in development. 23
In New York, drug courts were established first in Rochester and
Brooklyn in the mid-1990s, and have now grown to include twenty
operating courts, with an additional twenty in the planning stages.
A statewide apparatus has developed around these courts in New
York, including technology to track offenders, formal research
benchmarks to evaluate the courts' impacts, and an association that
promulgates best practices as they emerge.
What accounts for this rapid expansion? One answer can be
found in the research findings about drug courts. An emerging
body of evidence credits them with keeping offenders in treatment,
substantially reducing drug use and rates of re-arrest during the
period of program participation, and generating large savings in
avoided jail and prison costs. Though less conclusive, there is also
strong evidence to suggest that drug courts reduce long-term recid-
ivism for participants.
The most authoritative review of drug courts comes from Colum-
bia University's National Center on Addiction and Substance
Abuse, which analyzed thirty independent evaluations of twenty-
four drug court programs nationwide.24 Some of the most striking
findings from this meta-analysis include:
Coercion works. Drug court participants are far more likely to
successfully complete mandated substance abuse treatment than
comparable participants who seek help on a voluntary basis. One-
22. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNI-
CAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT AT AMERICAN UNIvERsrrY, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT
ACTIVITY BY STATE AND COUNTY (2000) (stating that forty-six states have imple-
mented and four are planning drug courts), at http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/justice.
23. Id.
24. Belenko, supra note 9, at 10.
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year treatment retention rates are 60% for drug courts, compared
to 10-30% among voluntary, residential treatment programs.2
Drug use and recidivism are substantially reduced during the pe-
riod of drug court participation. Drug court program lengths vary
from court to court, although most require a minimum of one
year's participation. For drug court participants, substance abuse is
greatly reduced during the period of program participation. A sur-
vey of thirteen drug courts found that, on average, 10% of urine
tests were positive for drugs, compared to 31% for defendants in
the same jurisdiction under probation supervision.2 6 Rates of re-
arrest for drug court enrollees are also quite low. In two evalua-
tions where comparison groups were employed, in Jackson County,
Missouri, and Ventura County, California, the re-arrest rates for
program participants were 4% and 12% respectively, as opposed to
13% and 32% in the control groups, over a six and eight-month
period.2 7
Post-program benefits, while not fully conclusive, are also posi-
tive. Drug court participants also have lower post-program re-ar-
rest rates. Of nine drug court evaluations that used a comparison
group, and included all drug court participants and not just gradu-
ates, eight found positive results. 8 One study conducted of the
Maricopa County, Arizona drug court showed a three-year recidi-
vism rate of 33% for program graduates and 43.7% for a compari-
son group.29 The average number of arrests for participants in the
Multnomah County, Oregon drug court after two years was 0.59,
compared to 1.53 for a control group.30 Less is known about post-
program impacts on employment, education, and drug use. Most
drug court evaluations have tracked program participants for only
a short period after leaving the program. Other drug courts have
not been in existence long enough to generate post-program
results.3'
Drug courts save money. Incarceration costs far more than ei-
ther residential or outpatient treatment, and drug courts consist-
ently save money even after factoring in administrative costs. The
savings are particularly dramatic when other benefits, such as re-
25. Belenko, supra note 9, at 29-30.
26. Belenko, supra note 9, at 36.
27. Belenko, supra note 9, at 37.
28. Belenko, supra note 9, at 39-41 (indicating lower re-arrest rates for drug court
participants compared to others in nine studies).
29. Belenko, supra note 9, at 39.
30. Belenko, supra note 9, at 41.
31. Belenko, supra note 9, at 27.
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duced recidivism, are factored in. A study of the Multnomah
County, Oregon drug court found that the court had achieved $2.5
million in criminal justice cost savings based on 440 participants
over a two-year period. 2 Additional savings outside the criminal
justice system-reductions in victimization, theft, public assistance,
and medical claims-were estimated to be an additional $10 mil-
lion.3 While no formal evaluation of drug court cost savings in
New York has been performed to date, the potential for savings is
enormous. In New York State, the average cost of incarceration is
$29,000 annually (and jail in New York City costs $68,000 per in-
mate annually), as compared to $5,100 for outpatient and $18,400
for inpatient, or residential, treatment.3 4 If implemented fully, the
state's Office of Court Administration estimates that Judge Kaye's
plan could result in annual government savings of $500 million.35
This includes $130 million in savings in prison and jail costs and
close to $400 million in saved public expenditures such as reduced
recidivism, public assistance, foster care, and health care costs. 36
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
With an eye toward these kinds of findings, Chief Judge Kaye
and Chief Administrative Judge Lippman have recommended insti-
tutionalizing the drug court approach throughout the New York
State court system. This will bring assessment, treatment, and
monitoring to thousands of defendants for an annual cost to the
state court system of between $20 and $22 million.37 It is fair to ask
what kinds of dividends this substantial investment will pay. Drug
courts have achieved remarkable results with non-violent offend-
ers, helping them achieve sobriety and avoid further involvement
in the criminal justice system. Bringing these kinds of results to as
many addicted defendants as possible is a goal well worth pursuing.
The potential ramifications of moving thousands of individuals
from addiction and criminal behavior to sobriety and stable com-
munity life are enormous, both for communities and for families.
For communities, it could mean safer streets and a measure of re-
32. Belenko, supra note 9, at 34.
33. Belenko, supra note 9, at 34.
34. FisKE CONINI'N REP., supra note 6, at 26.
35. The $500 million annual figure is determined by subtracting the cost of pro-
gram implementation from total projected benefits. Press Release, N.Y. State Office
of Court Administration, Cost Versus Project Savings of New Court-Mandated Treat-
ment Program (June 2000) (on file with authors).
36. Id.
37. FisKE CONIN'N RnP., supra note 6, at 121.
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lief from drug-fueled crime and disorder. For many families, it
could mean reunion with children lost to foster care. It could mean
healthier families, too, with fewer "crack babies." At a recent
graduation ceremony at the Rochester drug court, one program
participant who had successfully completed treatment underlined
the tangible, real-life benefits of the drug court model: "I had spent
every day stealing for the money to buy drugs, and every free min-
ute getting high. I got caught numerous times, but still I couldn't
stop. I had no support system, and no incentive to stop. Drug
court finally provided me with both. 38
The potential benefits to the criminal justice system are also sub-
stantial. The most obvious are the cost savings that might be
achieved by reducing both recidivism and reliance on prison. As
mentioned above, the state's Office of Court Administration esti-
mates that Judge Kaye's plan could result in $500 million in gov-
ernment savings.39 Reduced recidivism could also mean reduced
caseloads, alleviating some of the pressure that judges, prosecutors,
and defenders feel to move through dockets as quickly as possible.
And limiting caseloads could lead to more meaningful case out-
comes and an end to "revolving door justice." By achieving results
like these, drug courts have the potential to affect not only how
courts operate but how they are perceived. If drug courts do, in
fact, become a permanent part of the judicial landscape in New
York-and if they do continue to achieve demonstrable results-
they might go a long way toward restoring the legitimacy of the
court system, and helping to rebuild public confidence in judges,
attorneys, and police officers.
Large scale re-engineering of the courts is not without chal-
lenges, of course. What follows are a few of the issues that reform-
ers must face as they attempt to institutionalize drug courts in New
York.
Leadership: To date, New York's drug courts have been created
in jurisdictions where entrepreneurial judges or prosecutors have
been willing to exercise political and bureaucratic leadership.
Their leadership has been critical, helping win over reluctant gov-
ernment partners, raise funds, and build links with off-site treat-
ment providers. How can court administrators reach beyond the
cadre of initial drug court innovators to cultivate a new generation
of local leaders? For New York's comprehensive drug treatment
38. Susan K. Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-Solving Courts Pro-
vide Meaningful Alternatives to Traditional Remedies, 72 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 8, 10 (2000).
39. Fmkelstein, supra note 11.
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plan to be successful, it must reach out to new audiences in the
sixty-two counties across the state, including judges, prosecutors,
and defenders. Further, it must convince skeptics, agnostics, and
those who are unfamiliar with drug courts to embrace reform.
In building an outreach strategy, court administrators can draw
upon five years of experience in drug court replication. In that
time, New York has gone from a single drug court to more than
forty either in operation or in planning. The court system used sev-
eral techniques to introduce new jurisdictions to the drug court ap-
proach. By making sure that results are well-documented and well-
disseminated and by using existing courts as models, court adminis-
trators have been able to show system players across the state the
benefits of the drug court approach. By not requiring local juris-
dictions to conform to a one-size-fits-all model, they have been
sensitive to local legal cultures. And by creating a statewide associ-
ation of drug court professionals, they have helped legitimize drug
courts, providing a vehicle for information-sharing among profes-
sionals and opportunities for the uninitiated to learn about drug
courts.
Changing Roles: In drug courts, the traditional roles of "de-
tached judge" and "zealous advocate" are altered in some impor-
tant ways.4 0 The judge's role is greatly expanded: from that of a
neutral fact-finder to that of a problem-solver who uses the coer-
cive power at his or her disposal to help address an offender's drug
addiction. As judges step out of their conventional role, as they
become active problem solvers, it is crucial that they be provided
with a clear set of guidelines. One way to do this is to articulate
and broadly disseminate the outcomes that drug courts seek to
achieve. Chief Judge Kaye's drug treatment initiative sends a loud
message that the goal in adjudicating drug-related cases is not to
move through court calendars as quickly as possible, but to achieve
tangible results (e.g., increased sobriety, reductions in recidivism,
etc.).
The role of advocates in drug courts shifts as well: from one that
focuses on "winning" to one that creates case outcomes that serve
the best interest of both addicted offenders and the community.
For prosecutors, that might mean embracing new measures of suc-
cess. As Portland, Oregon District Attorney Mike Schrunk has
said, "Dismissing 1500 drug cases during the course of the year in a
drug court is a better end product than 1500 convictions in a regu-
40. See generally Greg Berman, What is a Traditional Judge Anyway?: Problem-
Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 1 (2000).
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lar court. '41 For defenders, the issue is similar, though a mirror
image-attempting to achieve the least restrictive result may not
be of long-term benefit for their clients if their drug addiction re-
mains untreated. The culture of cooperation in a drug court may
also be of concern for defense lawyers, because it departs from
their traditional, adversarial role.42 Drug court replication efforts
must honor these concerns and take pains to include both defend-
ers and prosecutors in the planning stages of any drug court. This
need for joint strategic planning represents a challenge for any
large, public bureaucracy unaccustomed to reaching beyond its
doors to involve outside partners.43
Specialization: Eighty percent of those arrested in New York
City test positive for drugs at the time of their arrest.44 An esti-
mated two-thirds of state prisoners are drug users. 45 Drugs are
clearly a system-wide issue for the courts. This raises the question:
are specialized courtrooms the answer for dealing with the problem
of drug addiction, or should every courtroom be equipped with the
technologies developed in drug courts? In making this decision,
court administrators are faced with a basic trade-off: balancing the
risk of watering down the effectiveness of drug courts by adopting
them in every courtroom with the risk of limiting their reach by
keeping them separate. This issue will become more important as
drug courts move from experimentation to full implementation,
and from urban centers to rural jurisdictions. If the answer is to
give all judges in the state the tools they need to link defendants to
treatment and monitor their progress, there will be a need for in-
tensive training and new measures of success to insure that the
quality of the drug court approach is maintained.
A related question is whether drug courts require specialized
judges. Some critics have wondered whether the majority of judges
are capable of adopting a new approach to working with defend-
ants and coordinating the work of partner agencies. Others argue
that the qualities of a good drug court judge are not all that differ-
ent from the qualities of a good judge. As Judge Truman Morrison
41. Id. at 7.
42. See Bennett H. Brummer, Independent, Professional Judgment: The Essence of
Freedom, 10 ST. TnoMAs L. REv. 607, 611 (1998).
43. What Does It Mean To Be A Good Lawyer?: Prosecutors and Defenders in
Problem-Solving Courts ( John Feinblatt & Derek Denckla, eds., 2000) (unpublished
paper, U.S. Dep't of Justice, March 2000) (on file with authors).
44. FisKE COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 15.
45. This is according to the New York State Department of Correctional Services.
FIsKE COMM'N REP., supra note 6, at 15.
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III of the District of Columbia Superior Court has said, "It strikes
me that [a drug court judge] ought to be... someone who is open
to other people's ideas, who listens, who is informed, who is impar-
tial .... If we put aside the real bad people who probably shouldn't
be on the bench anyway, most judges could do this job, many more
than do."46
Limits: In seeking to extend the drug court model to new popu-
lations, the state court system will have to confront a key question:
what are the limits of the drug court approach? Are there some
populations of addicted offenders for whom judicially-monitored
drug treatment is inappropriate? Three distinct populations of
drug-addicted offenders have, for the most part, been excluded
from drug courts. The first is substance abusers who have been
arrested for violent offenses or who have prior violent felony con-
victions. There are several reasons for their exclusion, including
concerns about the appropriateness of offering violent offenders an
alternative to incarceration and the strict eligibility requirement
imposed by federal funders explicitly limiting drug courts to non-
violent drug offenders. A second group that traditionally has been
excluded is low-level offenders whose crimes do not provide the
criminal justice system with sufficient leverage to compel enroll-
ment in a long-term treatment program. Finally, a third group is
offenders who are not arrested for drug crimes but whose offense is
driven by addiction. It is difficult to estimate how large these
"missing groups" of potential drug court participants are. How-
ever, it seems clear that drug courts, as they are currently operat-
ing, are not reaching their maximum potential population.
Any attempt to add these various populations to the mix will
face serious political and logistical obstacles. Including offenders
with violent criminal histories is largely a question of local toler-
ance. Some jurisdictions will be uncomfortable with extending
drug treatment to past violent offenders (e.g., someone with a ten-
year-old robbery conviction or a five-year-old house burglary);47
others may see the value in treating their addiction. In defining
drug court eligibility, court administrators will have to balance the
need to respect local preferences in each of New York's sixty-two
counties with a desire to create uniformity throughout the state.
The question of what to do with misdemeanants is equally com-
plicated. Chief Judge Kaye's plan suggests that there is a group of
46. Berman, supra note 40, at 4.
47. The Kaye plan does not contemplate offering treatment to offenders whose
current crime is a violent offense. FisKE CoMvi'N REP., supra note 6, at 4.
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chronic misdemeanor offenders in New York City who, because of
the length of their rap sheets, are potentially facing significant jail
or prison terms. This is a group that might reasonably be placed in
long-term treatment through a drug court. But what about the
misdemeanants whose offenses do not rise to this level? This boils
down to a question of what the legal marketplace will bear. It is
unlikely that any defense attorney is going to allow a client ar-
rested on a first-time shoplifting charge to accept one year of
mandatory drug treatment, no matter how severe his or her addic-
tion may be. One answer to this dilemma is suggested by the
Brooklyn Treatment Court, which links first-time misdemeanants
and others to a treatment readiness program that lasts for two days
in an effort to encourage these offenders voluntarily to seek out
long-term treatment.
Finally, reaching the third group-substance-abusing offenders
who do not commit drug offenses but whose crimes are motivated
by addiction-points to the need for comprehensive screening and
early assessment for all offenders brought into the state courts.
Building an infrastructure for achieving this will have to be part of
any system-wide reform effort.
Capacity: Any proposal that calls for offering treatment to a
large group of substance abusers must face the question of capac-
ity: will there be sufficient treatment resources to meet the de-
mand? Will there be enough slots for everyone? Who will
perform assessments of offenders to measure their addiction? In a
changing welfare and managed care landscape, who will pay for
treatment? These are, at base, questions of capacity. As suggested
earlier in this essay, strong evidence exists to suggest that up-front
expenditure on drug treatment saves considerable money in crimi-
nal justice and avoided costs of crime down the road. For drug
court reformers, then, the challenge becomes convincing other
branches of government-and the public-that such an investment
is a sound choice. Drug court reformers must also be creative
about tapping into unconventional funding streams. For example,
foster care and welfare agencies share common cause with courts
in helping individuals reach sobriety. Drug courts can make strong
arguments for creating new funding arrangements to reflect these
shared interests.
Size: One argument against institutionalizing drug courts is that
they will lose their unique character as they increase in number.
How can drug courts retain their intimacy? How crucial is it that
judges be conversant with each offender's case history and progress
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through treatment? Is it possible to create truly individualized
treatment plans for each and every eligible offender in the state?
One tool that might help solve this problem is computer technol-
ogy, which has the potential to help judges bring individualized at-
tention to large caseloads. Many drug courts are already using
computer applications to build and maintain a tremendous amount
of information about drug court defendants, information that is
made available to judges, advocates, and other courtroom players
as each case proceeds.48
Taking on the Critics: Any new policy innovation is bound to at-
tract critics, and drug courts are no exception. New York's drug
treatment initiative will face criticism from system players attached
to old ways of doing business; from skeptics who fear that courts
may be overstepping their boundaries in attempting to address
drug addiction;49 from civil libertarians concerned about any threat
to the due process rights of defendants;50 and finally, from observ-
ers who feel that offering treatment as an alternative to incarcera-
tion is "soft on crime." While serious, these are all concerns that
might reasonably be addressed through strategic planning that
brings all of the relevant players (judges, prosecutors, defenders,
treatment providers, community groups, and others) to the table to
plot a course for local jurisdictions and through rigorous research
that tracks-and disseminates-the results of this new judicial ap-
proach to drugs.51 1
It is also important to place the new initiative in proper context.
There is no more convincing argument for change than the contrast
between Judge Kaye's proposal and the reality of the current sys-
tem, one that continues to recycle drug-addicted offenders with lit-
tle apparent value for the courts, the public, or the offender. As
Judge Kaye has written, "Some may argue that such hands-on in-
volvement [of the courts] clashes with our branch's traditional dig-
nity and reserve. But what's the alternative? The flood of cases
48. CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION & STATE JUSTICE INST., EXPERIMENTS IN
TECHNOLOGY: A HANDBOOK FOR COURT ADM rNISTRATORS (1997).
49. Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1437, 1533
(2000); see also Eric Cohen, The Drug Court Revolution, 5 THE WYLY. STANDARD,
Dec. 27, 1999 (questioning whether drug courts really work, and examining their im-
pact on the judicial system), available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/maga... ag_
5_15_99/cohen feaL5_15_99.html.
50. See Feinblatt & Denckla, supra note 43.
51. Id.
2000]
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shows no sign of letting up. We can either bail faster or look for
new ways to stem the tide." 2
CONCLUSION
Institutionalization poses a unique set of challenges to public
policy reformers in any field, whether in courts, health, education,
or welfare.53 Creating successful demonstration projects is one
thing. Implementing a new idea across a statewide system is quite
another. Few public officials are willing to take on this challenge,
particularly in states as large, as complex, and as diverse as New
York.
With their proposal to bring the ideas pioneered in drug courts
to the rest of the New York State court system, Chief Judge Judith
Kaye and Chief Administrative Judge Jonathan Lippman are at-
tempting just this feat. The potential implications of their reform
effort are far-reaching. By placing greater emphasis on achieving
meaningful case outcomes, by encouraging judges and attorneys to
play new roles, and by working to solve problems rather than sim-
ply process cases, the New York drug treatment initiative seeks to
change how courts work and what the public should expect of
them.
52. Kaye, supra note 8.
53. LISBETH B. SCHORR, COMMON PURPOSE: STRENGTHENING FAMILIES AND
NEIGHBORHOODS TO REBUILD AMERICA (1997) (contending that Americans can cre-
ate strong and effective public institutions to solve social problems and giving exam-
ples of welfare, education, and child protection reforms).
